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The challenges faced by the Good News Bird Group in transitioning from traditional industrial strengths to online advantages were significant. The response was to leverage industrial thinking to build a new online brand, following the strategy of "making profits while investing and producing." This approach led to BONO's evolution from a single business man's brand to a full range of men's fashion design. It then expanded from product lines to stores, going through various trials and errors along the way.
In August 2009, when a reporter called Fang Xiaobo, the board secretary of the Good News Bird Group, to ask about the success of e-commerce, the response was modest: "We are still not doing enough well!" and they were unwilling to talk about it. Compared to the grand announcements two years earlier when the group declared its entry into e-commerce, this answer seemed unusually low-key. When visiting the Good News Bird e-commerce site, users saw a message that read, "Good News Network Mall Upgrade, Temporarily Closed," before being redirected elsewhere. In major online platforms like Sina, Sohu, Netease, and NetDragon, there was no visible promotion of Good News Bird.
Instead of focusing solely on e-commerce, the group took a different route, opening two custom shops—Carl Bono and Bono Tailor—with distinct positioning. This marked the start of a "network + entity" business model. Was this a step forward or a limitation?
Before 2007, PPG had swept through the garment industry with a whirlwind of e-commerce influence. At that time, the Shanghai Bao Birds Costume Company under the Good News Bird Group was preparing to go online. On August 16, 2007, the Good News Bird successfully listed on the SME board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, raising 302.4 million yuan and becoming Wenzhou’s first footwear industry-listed company. A week later, the bird brand officially launched the BONO brand and began online direct sales on October 8, 2007.
The news sparked widespread discussion. Supporters argued that BONO would be a “disruptor†in online sales due to three core competencies compared to other “light companiesâ€: an independent design team, control over industrial resources, and strong production capacity. These factors were seen as giving BONO an edge over competitors like PPG and VANCL. Unlike heavy brands such as Youngor, BONO was considered “lighter†since it focused on customization for banks, schools, and offices, without traditional retail channels or conflicts with them.
However, opponents raised valid concerns. They pointed out that traditional enterprises often lack the “gene†for e-commerce. While the concept of transformation sounded promising, many failed in practice. For example, BONO’s so-called strengths—its design team and fabric suppliers—did not necessarily translate to cost efficiency. High prices could hurt online competitiveness. Additionally, BONO’s previous focus on B2B might not translate well to B2C.
VANCL’s CEO once remarked, “In theory, Good News Bird is the easiest to succeed in online sales; in practice, it may be the most likely to fail.†This highlighted the challenges of balancing online and offline operations.
Despite these issues, BONO continued its e-commerce journey. In July 2007, the Good News Bird Group established a joint venture called Shanghai Bao Bird Textile Technology Co., Ltd., which unified both traditional and online direct marketing brands under the BONO name. By late 2007, the group had invested 80 million yuan in BONO, signaling a strong commitment to e-commerce.
However, things soon changed. The departure of BONO’s general manager, Tian Jian, raised questions about the company’s ability to succeed in online sales. Internal restructuring followed, and BONO shifted from selling only shirts to offering a full range of men’s clothing, emphasizing fashion design over standardized products. This change, however, came at a cost, as millions had already been spent on promoting the “businessmen†brand.
By mid-2008, BONO faced more challenges. The company announced a fund reallocation, shifting investment from suits and shirts to acquiring equity in a garment company. Analysts saw this as an attempt to expand network channels and diversify income sources. Fang Xiao-bo, the Board Secretary, emphasized that e-commerce was a trend but that the company would take a steady approach.
Compared to VANCL, which had strong venture capital backing and aggressive marketing, BONO struggled to match its pricing strategy. While BONO aimed for quality and mid-to-high pricing, VANCL offered lower prices, making it more competitive in the market.
As a result, BONO eventually shifted back to offline strategies, launching community-based custom shops. These stores served as both physical outlets and experience centers, combining online and offline elements. This move reflected a broader shift in how e-commerce was being redefined—not just as pure online sales, but as a blend of digital and physical experiences.
Ultimately, while BONO did not achieve the same level of success as some of its competitors, it managed to build brand awareness and expand its market presence. The journey of the Good News Bird Group highlights the complex path of traditional brands adapting to the digital age.